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THE NOT SO SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DETERMINES THAT EMPLOYER-PAID AIRFARE IS NOT
"WAGES" SUBJECT TO WITHHOLDING TAXES
CRYSTAL OVSAK*
"Home may be where the heart is, but it definitely is not at Dead
Horse at Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska."l Indeed, whether
[the town of] Dead Horse could constitute a "tax home" lay at the very
heart of a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, HB & R, Inc.
v. United States.2 Set against a backdrop of contention concerning the
location of an employee's tax home and its impact on employment
related travel expenses, the Eighth Circuit determined that employer-paid
airfare did not constitute "wages" subject to withholding taxes. 3 To
understand the Eighth Circuit's analysis, however, it is necessary to
consider certain basic tax issues relevant to employee travel.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE WITHHOLDING OBLIGATION
"The employment relationship involves two distinct taxpayers: the
employer and the employee." 4 Compensation in the form of wages
constitutes gross income subject to taxation for the employee. 5 Compen-
sation in the form of "fringe benefits" that are not de minimis also
constitutes gross income subject to taxation for the employee. 6 Thus,
what an employer pays in wages and fringe benefits is taxable income to
the employee and an ordinary and necessary business deduction to the
employer. 7
* Crystal M. Ovsak is an associate attorney with Fredrikson & Byron, P.A. in Minneapolis,
Minnesota where she practices principally in commercial and tax litigation. Ms. Ovsak received her
J.D. from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 2000 and is licensed to practice in
Minnesota and North Dakota.
1. HB & R, Inc. v. United States, No. AI-96-141, slip op. at 1 (D. N.D. Apr. 28, 1998).
2. 229 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
3. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 690.
4. Id.
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (1994) (defining gross income as encompassing "all income from
whatever source derived," including "[c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items") [hereinafter I.R.C.].
6. Id. Most examples of taxable fringe benefits include benefits with an element of personal
pleasure or recreation, such as employer-provided tickets to sporting events, country club member-
ships, or airline tickets for vacation destinations. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21(a)(1) (2001). Likewise, the
fringe benefit of commuting to work in an employer-provided vehicle is valued at $1.50 per each
one-way commute. Id. § 1.61-21(k)(3).
7. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (defining gross income); I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing
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Because wages constitute taxable income to the employee, the
employee owes federal income tax on the wages. 8 In addition, both the
employer and the employee owe Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) taxes, such as Medicare and social security, on the wages. 9 To
make the tax collection system more efficient by collecting taxes "at the
source," employers are required to deduct and withhold from an em-
ployee's wages the federal income taxes and FICA taxes that the em-
ployee is likely to owe. 10 Employers then remit to the government these
withheld sums, along with the employer's own share of the FICA tax.1 I
The employer's obligation to withhold extends only to an employ-
ee's wages. 12 It does not apply to other types of employee income, such
as dividends or the reimbursement of deductible expenses.1 3 While
wages usually constitute income, many items that qualify as income are
clearly not wages. 14 Thus, discerning between the two for withholding
purposes is imperative. When a tax deficiency is assessed based upon an
employer's alleged failure to withhold, the definition of "wages" in the
withholding statutes becomes critical.
B. THE DEFINITION OF "WAGES"
Under Internal Revenue Code § 3401(a), "wages" for income tax
withholding purposes include "all remuneration [for employment],
including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in
any medium other than cash."15 Similarly, "wages" for FICA tax with-
holding purposes include "all remuneration for employment, including
the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any
that a business may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the pursuit of business).
8. See I.R.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth the tax imposed).
9. See I.R.C. § 3101 (1994) (setting forth the employee tax); I.R.C. § 3111 (1994) (setting forth
the employer tax). The FICA tax rules are codified in chapter 21 of the Code. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3121
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). Currently, § 3101 imposes an aggregate tax of 7.65% on an individual's
wages, payable by the employee to the federal government. Similarly, § 3111 imposes an aggregate
tax of 7.65% on an individual's wages, payable by the employer to the federal government.
10. See I.R.C. § 3402(a) (1994) (setting forth the withholding of income tax requirement); I.R.C.
§ 3102(a) (1994) (setting forth the withholding of FICA tax requirement). The amount of tax to be
withheld and paid is determined by the amount of "wages" paid to the employee. I.R.C. §§ 311 (a),
3121(a), 3401(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11. See I.R.C. §§ 3102, 3402 (1994).
12. Id. §§ 3102, 3402(a).
13. Section 3101 imposes the employee FICA tax only on wages received by the individual with
respect to employment, as that term is defined in § 3121(b). Section 3111 imposes the employer FICA
tax only on wages paid to an individual with respect to employment, as that term is defined in §
3121(b). In turn, § 3121(b) defines "employment" as "any service, of whatever nature, performed"
by an employee. Thus, to be subject to FICA taxation, the amounts received by the employee must be
(1) income (for the employee's portion); (2) wages (as defined in § 3121(b)); and (3) received with
respect to employment. Kevin Wiggins, Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income and the FICA Tax Treatment
of Employee Stock Purchase Plans, THE TAx LAWYER, Spring 2000, at 5.
14. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Unites States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1918).
15. I.R.C. § 3401(a).
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medium other than cash."1 6 Accordingly, for both income and FICA
tax withholding purposes, the Code defines "wages" as including all
non-cash remuneration or fringe benefits valued at the excess of its fair
market value over any amount paid by the employee for the benefit.17
Under both statutes, however, "wages" do not include amounts that the
employer reasonably believes are excludable from the employee's
income under Code § 132.18
Code § 132 permits an employee to exclude from income, among
other items, any "working condition fringe" which, if paid for by the
employee, would be deductible under Code § 162 as an employee
business expense.19 Section 162, in turn, provides for the deduction of
ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses, including travel
expenses incurred "while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business." 20  An employee may not, however, deduct personal
expenses. 2 1 Thus, to the extent that any travel expenses are
predominantly personal in nature, they are not deductible under § 162.22
In aggregate, the FICA and income tax withholding statutes provide that
if the costs associated with work-related travel would have been
16. I.R.C. § 3121(a).
17. I.R.C. § 132 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Finance Comm. Portion of Reconciliation Report
at 367-68, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 326 (discussing application of employment taxes to the
value of free airfare provided by airlines to their employees).
18. I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)(20), 3401(a)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Specifically, Code § 3121(a)(20)
excludes from wages "any benefit provided to or on behalf of an employee if at the time such benefit
is provided it is reasonable to believe that the employee will be able to exclude such benefit from
income under section .. .132." Likewise, Code § 3401(a)(19) excludes from wages "any benefit
provided to or on behalf of an employee if at the time such benefit is provided it is reasonable to
believe that the employee will be able to exclude such benefit from income under section ... 132."
Exempting from withholding those amounts that do not constitute taxable income is consistent with the
legislative history of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
301-306 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). Specifically, with regard to the FICA taxation scheme, Senator
Harrison remarked that the tax on employees would be a tax on their wages and that employers
"would also pay a similar tax at the same rates, based on the taxable pay of each employee." 79
CONG. REC. 9268 (1935) (emphasis added).
19. I.R.C. § 132(d) defines a "working condition fringe" as "any property or services provided to
an employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services,
such payment would be allowable as a deduction under section 162 or 167." Also excludable under §
132(b) are "no-additional-cost" services and qualified employee discounts provided by an employer to
an employee for use by the employee or the employee's spouse and dependent children. To be
excluded under the "no-additional-cost" exception, the service must be the same type of service that is
sold to the public in the ordinary course of the employer's line of business in which the employee
performs services. See I.R.C. § 132(b); see also Finance Comm., supra note 17, at 367-68.
20. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). The travel expense deduction specifically includes "amounts expended
for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances."
Id.
21. I.R.C. § 262 (1994).
22. See I.R.C. § 262(a) (providing that "no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses"); see also Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945) (determining that an
employee's travel expenses were incurred because of his personal choice to live far away from his
employment and thus, were not deductible under § 162).
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deductible to the employee if the employee paid for it, the costs are not
"wages" subject to withholding if the employer pays for the travel.
C. EMPLOYEE'S DEDUCTION OF COMMUTING EXPENSES UNDER § 162
The deductibility of travel expenses under § 162 has been a contest-
ed issue since the section's inception. 23 In 1945, the United States
Supreme Court made its most significant pronouncement on the issue in
Commissioner v. Flowers.24 The taxpayer in Flowers was general coun-
sel for Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad, which maintained its primary
office in Mobile, Alabama.2 5 For personal reasons however, Flowers
resided in Jackson, Mississippi, and traveled to Mobile thirty-three times
during 1939 and forty times during 1940 to perform his job duties. 26
Flowers personally paid for the travel expenses and then deducted the
costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162.27
In analyzing whether Flowers' travel expenses were deductible, the
Court formulated a three-pronged test for the deduction of travel expens-
es. 28 First, the expenses must be "reasonable and necessary traveling
expense[s], as that term is generally understood," such as for transpor-
tation fares, food, and lodging. 29 Second, "[t]he expense must be
incurred 'while away from home."' 30 Third, "[t]he expense must be
incurred in [the] pursuit of business." 31 The third prong is met when
there is a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on
of the employer's business. 32
Concluding that Flowers' expenses were not deductible, the United
States Supreme Court stated that whether Flowers was "away from
home" was irrelevant since the expenses were not incurred in the pursuit
of business, as required by the third prong of the deductibility test. 33
23. See, e.g., Bixler v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927). In Bixler, the Board of Tax Appeals
held that the precursor to § 162(a)(2) was intended to permit a deduction for travel expenses only if
the expenses were incurred while the taxpayer was away from his post of duty or place of
employment. Id. at 1184.
24. 326 U.S. 465 (1945).
25. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 467.
26. Id. at 467-68. Flowers worked for the railroad in Mobile for a total of 66 days in 1939 and
102 days in 1940. Id. at 468.
27. Id. at 468-69.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also infra Part I.D.
31. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1945).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 471-72. After noting the conflicting definitions of "home," the Court stated, "[w]e
deem it unnecessary here to enter into or to decide this conflict." Id. at 472.
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With respect to the expenses in question, the Court specifically stated
that:
They were incurred solely as a result of the taxpayer's desire to
maintain a home in Jackson while working in Mobile, a factor
irrelevant to the maintenance and prosecution of the railroad's
legal business. The railroad did not require him to travel on
business from Jackson or Mobile or to maintain living quarters
in both cities.
. . . The exigencies of business rather than the personal con-
veniences and necessities of the traveler must be the motivating
factors. Such was not the case here.34
Thus, Flowers is often cited for the general rule that an employee's
expenses in commuting from home to work are personal expenses, not
deductible business expenses, because the location of the employer's
residence in relation to the employee's place of business is generally
motivated by personal, rather than business, concerns. 35 Indeed, Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.262-1(b)(5) expressly follows Flowers by
providing that "It]he taxpayer's costs of commuting to his place of
business or employment are personal expenses and do not qualify as
deductible expenses." 36 Thus, the central importance of Flowers is its
requirement of a direct connection between the expenditure and the
"exigencies" of the employer's business. 37 Under Flowers, if the
exigencies of the employer's business motivate the employee's travel,
the employee can deduct the travel expenses if the employer does not
reimburse the employee. 38 Conversely, if the employee's travel is
motivated by purely personal reasons, the employee cannot deduct travel
expenses. 39
Consequently, when an employer requires an employee to travel to
a temporary work-site, courts have generally held that the employee can
deduct the expenses of such travel since the costs are incurred because of
the exigencies of the employer's business, rather than the personal
desires of the employee.40 By requiring that the taxpayer's travel costs
34. Id. at 473-74.
35. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1971).
36. 26 C.F.R. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (2001); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-2(e) (2001) (providing that
"[c]ommuters' fares are not considered as business expenses and are not deductible").
37. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1945).
38. Id. at 474.
39. Id. at 473.
40. Compare Frederick v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding a
finding that a three-year stint at a distant construction project was "temporary" and concluding that the
costs of travel to the distant site were deductible) with Walraven v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1246, 1248
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding that a construction worker's three-year work term at a nuclear power plant
project 150 miles from his residence was not temporary and concluding that the costs of his travel to
2001] 437
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be incurred in the pursuit of and because of the exigencies of his em-
ployer's business, Flowers has provided a useful mechanism for sorting
between travel motivated by business reasons and travel motivated by
personal reasons.41 The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") has
apparently been dissatisfied with its ability to limit deductions under the
third prong of Flowers. Thus, the Service has also attacked commuting
expenses under the second prong of Flowers, which requires that the
expenses be incurred while away from home, by manipulating the
definition of "home" and when an employee has travel away from such
home.4 2
D. THE DIVERGENCE IN THE MEANING OF "HOME"
In accordance with the second prong of Flowers, courts often have
analyzed an employee's deduction of travel expenses based on whether
the employee was "away from home." 43 The debate concerning what
constitutes an employee's tax home for such purposes, however, has
resulted in a split of authority. 44 Pursuant to that split, some courts have
interpreted "home" to mean residential home, whereas others have inter-
preted "home" to mean the place where the employee works. 45 The
Supreme Court, despite three opportunities to resolve the split in authori-
ty, has not provided any definitive guidance to the circuit courts. 46 For
the work-site were not deductible). See generally Michael D. Rose, The Deductibility of Daily Trans-
portation Expenses To and From Distant Work Sites, 36 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1983). Most courts
continued to analyze the deductibility of travel expenses based on whether the employee was traveling
to a permanent or temporary work-site. See, e.g., Harris v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126,
1132 (1980), affd 679 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1982); McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505, 506 (1978);
Norwood v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 467 (1976). The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201-13556 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) clarified the issue of
what constitutes a temporary work-site for deduction of travel expenses. As a result of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, § 162(a) was amended to provide that a "taxpayer shall not be treated as being
temporarily away from home during any period of employment if such period exceeds I year."
41. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474.
42. According to the Commissioner, "away from home" means away from the taxpayer's "tax
home," and a taxpayer's "tax home" is that person's "home post" or place of employment. Flowers,
326 U.S. at 471. This analysis was adopted by a number of courts, yet rejected by others. Compare
O'Toole v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 302, 303 (2d Cir. 1957) (stating that "home" means a "taxpayer's
principal place of business or employment") and Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913, 917 (4th Cir.
1945) with Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1964) and Wright v. Hartsell, 305
F.2d 221, 224 (9th Cir. 1962) (rejecting the Service's argument that "home" means principal place of
business). As a result of those cases adopting the "tax home" concept, the word "home" became a
term of art with a meaning different from its normal usage as a residence, domicile, or dwelling place.
See, e.g., O'Toole, 243 F.2d at 303 (stating taxpayer's home was where he was employed).
43. See, e.g., Ellwein v. United States, 778 F.2d 506, 509 (8th Cir. 1985).
44. Compare Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971) (adopting a residential test of "home") with Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437
(8th Cir. 1981) (utilizing a vocational definition of "home").
45. See infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 293-95 (1967) (concluding that a Marine
Corps captain's tax home was his military post in Iwakuni, Japan, even though he maintained a perma-
nent home in California and acknowledging the vocational test, but making its conclusion based on the
unique circumstances of military personnel); Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 59-61 (1958)
438
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its part, the Service has consistently read Flowers as disallowing any
commuting expense incurred from or to the employee's workplace. 47
1. Residential Home
The less frequently utilized definition of "tax home" is that of the
taxpayer's residential home. 48 Pursuant to the residential test, an
employee's tax home is the employee's residence or abode.49 The
deductibility of travel expenses under the residential test hinges on
whether the employee has traveled away from his or her home, as that
word is generally understood. 50 Courts adopting the residential defini-
tion of home assert that "home" means home in its usual sense and not
the employee's principal place of business. 51 While the Eighth Circuit
initially adopted the residence test, 52 it now utilizes the vocational home
definition. 53
2. Vocational Home
The more frequently utilized definition of a tax home, and that
advocated by the Service in most cases, is that of the taxpayer's vocation-
al home. 54 Although the Supreme Court has declined to adopt any
(declining to adopt a definition of tax home and instead determining that three construction workers
who were respectively employed at a distant work site for periods of 20.5, 12.5, and 8.5 months,
during which they maintained permanent residences elsewhere, were unable to deduct the amounts
expended on transportation to the job site and board and lodging while at the job site); Commissioner v.
Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 472 (1946) (concluding that the Court did not need to determine what
constituted the taxpayer's tax home because it could decide the case on other grounds).
47. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474.
48. Rosenspan, 438 F.2d at 912.
49. Id. at 910-12.
50. See, e.g., Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. See Rosenspan, 438 F.2d at 910-11. The taxpayer in Rosenspan was a jewelry salesman who
traveled during ten months of the year, but returned to a hotel in New York City five or six times each
year. Id. at 907. The taxpayer attempted to use his employer's principal place of business as his "tax
home" in order to deduct his travel expenses. Id. Although the court agreed that "home" meant home
in the usual sense of the word, the court determined that the taxpayer had no such "home" and was
thus not entitled to deduct his expenses. Id. at 912.
52. See Commissioner v. Janss, 260 F.2d 99, 104 (8th Cir. 1958) (concluding that although a col-
lege student was away from home, his travel to Alaska for summer employment was not done in the
pursuit of his employer's business, and thus he was unable to deduct the costs of traveling to Alaska);
Fischer v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 990 (1960); Schreiner v. McCrory, 186 F. Supp. 819, 823
(D. Neb. 1960) (permitting a traveling salesman to deduct travel expenses incurred while away from
Omaha, Nebraska, where he maintained a residence with his wife).
53. Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 1981).
54. See Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1981) (concluding that a Har-
vard law student residing in New York while employed as a summer associate was not entitled to
deduct the cost of transportation, meals, and lodging incurred during her summer employment), ceri.
denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding
that a salesman was not permitted to deduct the costs of traveling from Virginia to Philadelphia, where
the salesman's primary business was concentrated); Michel v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th
Cir. 1980) (using the vocational test in determining that the indefinite nature of the taxpayer's employ-
ment made Tehran, Iran, his tax home); Lewia v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 1321, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(concluding that because a shoe factory consultant's distant work location had ceased being
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definition of a "tax home," 55 the Court has implicitly agreed with the
vocational home definition, albeit in a split decision. 56 Under the voca-
tional test, an employee's tax home is the employee's principal place of
employment. 57 Deduction of travel expenses under the vocational test
hinges on whether the employee has traveled away from the employee's
principal place of business. 58 An employee's principal place of business
is generally understood to be that work place location where the
taxpayer has continued prospects of employment. 59
The vocational test assumes that an employee will locate the em-
ployee's residence as close as possible to his or her workplace. 60 That
assumption becomes complicated, however, when the employee cannot
locate his or her residence near the workplace, such as where the em-
ployee's work-site is physically situated or restricted in such a way that
the employee is literally precluded from living in close proximity to the
work-site. 61 In such instances, the employee cannot satisfy the vocation-
al test's presumption that the employee will maintain an abode near the
employee's principal place of business because there is presumably no
reasonable expectation that an employee will live where, in fact, the
employee cannot live.62 Despite the employee's inability to live near the
temporary, it had become his tax home, and thus he was not permitted to deduct costs); Markey v.
Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1253 (6th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60; see also 26
C.F.R. § 1.911-2(b) (2001).
55. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56. See Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 290-92 (1967).
57. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37.
58. See Weiberg, 639 F.2d at 437. Under the vocational test, a taxpayer's tax home is transient
according to where the employee's principal place of business is located. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2
C.B. 37. A taxpayer who accepts permanent employment in a new location is deemed to have
relocated his or her "tax home." See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 444 F.2d 508, 510-11 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding that a graduate student who relocated to Ohio from Texas to participate in his
employer's fellowship program had relocated his tax home to Ohio and thus was not permitted to
deduct costs of meals and lodging during the three-year school period).
59. See sources cited supra note 58.
60. See HB & R, Inc. v. United States, No. A1-96-141, slip op. at 4 (D. N.D. Apr. 29, 1998) (stat-
ing that "there is a 'reasonable expectation' that the taxpayer will locate his 'home' for tax purposes
at his major post of duty so as to minimize the amount of business travel away from home that is
required and that anything else is not business necessity but is a personal consideration"); see also
Coombs v. Commissioner, 608 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the "tax home" is the
taxpayer's personal residence when a regularly employed taxpayer maintains his or her personal
residence within the general area of employment or as close as reasonably possible); Folkman v.
United States, 615 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a taxpayer's tax home is "the ... abode at
his or her principal place of employment").
61. See, e.g., United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243, 246-47 (10th Cir. 1969) (denying the
deduction of the costs associated with commuting twenty-seven miles from a rocket testing facility to
the nearest housing even though the employee was not permitted to reside at the facility and could not
find housing in the community nearest the facility).
62. See HB & R, No. A 1-96-141, slip op. at 4. In the opinion of the district court in HB & R, "it is
wrong to attempt to apply general principles which work 99 percent of the time to the 1 percent where
those regulations do not fit." id.
440
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work-site, however, courts in such cases have refused to permit deduction
of the employee's expenses incurred in traveling to work. 63
Thus, in Edmands v. Commissioner,64 the Tax Court refused to
permit an oil worker to deduct the costs of traveling from his home to
his place of employment at a pump station on the Trans-Alaska pipeline,
where he was unable to live. 65 The oil worker worked eight days at the
pump station, followed by six days of rest at his home in Kasilof,
Alaska. 66 Every six days the taxpayer drove twenty-two miles from
Kasilof to Kenai, Alaska, to take a commercial airline flight to Anchor-
age, Alaska, where he caught a charter flight directly to the pump-
station. 67 Precluding the taxpayer from deducting the costs of the
commercial flight from Kenai to Anchorage, the Tax Court concluded
that the costs constituted personal commuting expenses. 68
E. TRAVEL EXPENSES AND THE EMPLOYER
The complexities of the employee's deduction of travel expenses is
further complicated when an employer reimburses the employee or
otherwise pays for the expenses. 69 Generally, an employer may reim-
burse an employee for ordinary and necessary business expenses, such
as those incurred when an employee travels from one work location to
another. 70 In such instances, the employer may reimburse the employee
and deduct the expenses from its taxable income, so long as the expenses
are substantiated and the reimbursement payment is made separately
63. Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 247; Pilcher v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 717, 718 (10th Cir. 1981) (pre-
cluding deduction of the costs of commuting sixty-seven miles to an employee's work-site); Coombs v.
Commissioner, 608 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979) (precluding deduction for the costs of commuting
sixty-five miles from nuclear test site to nearest habitable community); Sanders v. Commissioner, 439
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1971) (precluding a civilian employee of an air force base to deduct the costs of
commuting there, even though he was prohibited from living on the base). But see Wright v. Hartsell,
305 F.2d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 1962) (concluding that "a taxpayer's inability to live near his job site is a
valid ground for deduction as travel expense of the resulting cost of his transportation, food and
lodging").
64. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 167 (1989).
65. Edmands, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) at 167.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Interestingly, the Service did not seek to include as income the value of the employer pro-
vided airfare from Anchorage to the pump station. Id. This is surprising, given the Service's previous
success in arguing against deduction of expenses paid in traveling to work sites where employees
were not permitted to live. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. The court did not discuss
the deductibility of the twenty-two mile driving commute from Kasilof to Kenai. Edmands, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 167.
69. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-l(h) (2001).
70. Id. (applicable to tax periods before July 1, 1990); Id. §§ 31.3401(a)-4(d), 31.3121(a)-3(c)
(applicable to tax periods after June 30, 1990).
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from the employee's wage payment. 71 When this is done, the reimburse-
ment typically does not constitute either taxable income or a wage to the
employee. 72
In Revenue Ruling 76-453, however, the Service asserted that
reimbursements paid to employees for commuting expenses would be
considered wages for purposes of FICA and income tax withholding. 73
Congress immediately responded by issuing a moratorium against the
position advanced by the ruling. 74 Indeed, prior to the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 76-453, several courts had rejected the Service's argu-
ments that an employer's reimbursement or payment of employee travel
expenses constituted wages subject to withholding. 75
F. THE NARROW VIEW OF AN EMPLOYER'S WITHHOLDING OBLIGATION
As noted earlier, "wages" is a significantly narrower concept than
"gross income" because while wages invariably constitute income to an
employee, not all income is composed of wages. 76 A circumscribed
71. Id. §§ 31.3401(a)-4(a), 31.3121(a)-3(a).
72. Id. §§ 31.3401(a)-4(a), 31.3121(a)-3(a).
73. Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86. Rev. Rul. 76-453 revoked former Rev. Rul. 53-190 and
was issued in response to the Tax Court's decision in Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 27 (1971). In
Turner, the Tax Court determined that "commuting is commuting," whether to a temporary or perma-
nent work-site; consequently, the costs associated with such commutes are non-deductible, and
employer reimbursements of those costs should be included in the wage base for employment tax
purposes. Id.
74. See Act of October 7, 1978, Pub. L. 95-427, sec. 2, 92 Stat. 966 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.) (mandating that Rev. Rul. 76-453 not be applied to taxable periods between January
1, 1977 and December 31, 1979); Tax Treatment Extension Acts of 1977, Pub. L. 95-615, sec. 2, 92
Stat. 3097 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Act of December 29, 1979, Pub. L. 96-167,
sec. 2, 93 Stat. 1275 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 62 (1994 & Supp. V)) (mandating that the moratorium be
extended to May 31, 1981); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 40 Fed. Reg. 41 (1975) (setting forth
a proposed regulation concerning taxation of fringe benefits). In response to the moratorium, the Ser-
vice announced that the effective date of Rev. Rul. 76-453 would be "suspended indefinitely" pending
the issuance of proposed regulations inviting public comment. Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1977-2 I.R.B. 45.
The Service also advised examining agents not to make adjustments for substantiated transportation ex-
penses to temporary job sites. See Michael D. Rose, The Deductibility of Daily Transportation Expens-
es To and From Distant Temporary Work Sites, 36 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543 (1983). Congress finally
addressed the issue in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, by including
"fringe benefits" as an item of gross income in I.R.C. § 61(a)(l). See generally, Peter W. Colby,
Comment, Federal Withholding on Employee Fringe Benefits for Income and Social Security Taxes, 70
CAL. L. REV. 178 (1982); David M. Graf, Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 251 (1986).
75. See Stubbs, Overberg & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1148 (5th Cir. 1971)
(finding that a per diem paid to employees for trips from Houston, Texas, to Bartlesville, Oklahoma, to
perform a contract that lasted one year was not wages subject to withholding); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 373 F.2d 924, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding that travel expenses paid to employees to
attend a convention did not constitute wages subject to withholding); Acacia Mutual Life Ins. v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 188, 189 (D. Md. 1967); England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
76. See supra Part I.B.
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interpretation of what constitutes wages subject to withholding is consis-
tent with the policy of minimizing an employer's exposure to liability
for withholding another taxpayer's, such as its employee's, taxes.
Thus, in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States77 the
Supreme Court articulated its narrow view of the withholding statutes. 78
The employer in Central Illinois reimbursed its employees for lunch on
occasions when they were not away on business overnight, but were
nevertheless completing business-related duties. 79 Rejecting the Ser-
vice's attempt to subject the reimbursements to withholding taxes, the
Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is one thing to say that reimbursements constitute income
to the employees for income tax purposes, and it is quite
another thing to say that it follows therefrom that the reim-
bursements in 1963 were subject to withholding. There is a
gap between the premise and the conclusion and it is a wide
one.... To require the employee to carry the risk of his own
tax liability is not the same as to require the employer to carry
the risk of the tax liability of its employee. Required withhold-
ing, therefore, is rightly much narrower than subjectability to
income taxation. 80
Since its decision in Central Illinois, the Supreme Court has contin-
ued to subscribe to a limited view of an employer's withholding obliga-
tion. 81 Thus, in Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States,82 the Supreme Court
concluded that an employer did not have a duty to withhold FICA and
income taxes on the value of lodging and meals provided to its em-
ployees on an offshore oil rig. 83 Although the employees in Rowan
were flown at company expense up to sixty miles from land to the
offshore oilrig, the Service argued only for taxation of the value of the
food and lodging. 84 Noting that "'wages' is a narrower concept than
77. 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
78. Central Illinois, 435 U.S. at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 29.
81. Id.
82. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
83. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 254.
84. Id.
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'income," 85 the Court concluded that the value of employer provided
meals and lodging was not wages subject to FICA withholding.86
II. THE EXIGENCIES OF HB & R, INC.'S BUSINESS
In November 2000, the Eighth Circuit was called upon to resolve
whether the value of employer-paid airline tickets was wages subject to
FICA and income tax withholding.87 The taxpayer at issue in HB & R,
Inc. v. United States,88 was HB & R, Inc. (HB & R), a Montana corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Dickinson, North Dakota. 89
HB & R provides "hot oil services" 90 to oil companies at Prudhoe Bay
in Alaska, also known as the "North Slope." 9' The services are pro-
vided on an as-requested basis, with the oil companies dictating the
necessity and amount of work to be done. 92
Because of the inhospitable climate and security concerns, it is
impossible to live on the North Slope. 93 The nearest residential commu-
nity is Fairbanks, Alaska, nearly 500 miles away by a gravel road, on
which no one is permitted to drive without permission of the oil
85. Id. Although the Social Security Amendments of 1983 statutorily overruled Rowan, at least
two circuit courts have relied on Rowan to hold that amounts excluded from income are not wages
subject to FICA withholding. See Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, 127 (1983) (overruling Rowan); see
also Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 1996) and Gerbec v. United States, 164 F.3d
1015, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999) (relying on Rowan).
86. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 254; see also I.R.C. § 3121(a) (specifying that nothing in the regulations
concerning income tax withholding, "which provides an exclusion from 'wages' ... shall be construed
to require a similar exclusion from 'wages' in the regulations prescribed for purposes of ["CA with-
holding]"; S. Rep. No. 98-23, at 42 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 183 (providing that
"amounts exempt from income tax withholding should not be exempt from FICA unless Congress
provides an explicit FICA tax exclusion"); Anderson v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 530, 536 (1991)
(holding that the language in § 3121 evidences the "manifest congressional intent that merely because
an item is exempt from federal income taxes does not mandate that it be exempt from FICA taxes").
87. HB & R, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 2000).
88. 229 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
89. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689.
90. The hot oil services consist primarily of the injection of fluid under high pressure into oil wells
to inhibit the formation of scale in the pipes, to control the formation of paraffin in the oil being
pumped, to heat flow lines from the well to the pipeline, and to introduce heated methanol into the well
to control permafrost. Brief on Appeal for Appellant and Cross-Appellee at 3, HB & R, Inc. v. United
States, 229 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3206) [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief on Appeal"].
91. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. The oil companies with which HB & R contracted during the tax
years in question were British Petroleum, Arco Petroleum, and Conoco. Appellant's Brief on Appeal
at 3, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
92. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 3-4, HB & R (No. 99-3206). HB & R is paid on a job-by-job
basis. Id. at 4. Consequently, if no work is done, HB & R is not paid. Id. Likewise, if there are no
jobs to be done, HB & R's employees do not work and are not paid. Id. at 9.
93. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. "Life, with a family, is not possible at the work site." HB & R, Inc.
v. United States, No. Al-96-141, slip op. at 2 (D. N.D. Apr. 28, 1998). Access to the entire 80 to 100
square-mile area known as the North Slope is denied without a special permit issued by the oil
companies. See Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 6, HB & R (No. 99-3206). There is no land for sale
and no apartments or other rental facilities in the area. Id. There are no medical facilities except for
a first-aid station manned by a paramedic. Id.
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companies. 94 Because of these circumstances, when HB & R receives a
work request from an oil company, it deploys its workers from their
homes to the North Slope for a three-week on and three-week off
rotation. 95 During the three-week work rotation, the employees live in
oil company-owned barracks where they enjoy "virtually no recreation-
al amenities." 96 The workers can be called upon to work anywhere
within the one hundred square mile region of the North Slope and often
work very long hours.97
Most of HB & R's employees live in the continental United States
(the "lower forty-eight"). 98 Consequently, when it is an employee's
turn to travel to the North Slope, the employee must leave his or her
home in the lower forty-eight and fly to the North Slope, stopping first
in Anchorage, Alaska, and then flying on to the Dead Horse Airport. 99
Although HB & R has offered its employees a $400 per month salary
incentive to relocate to Alaska, most employees continue to live in the
lower forty-eight.100 HB & R's efforts to recruit Alaska natives for
employment have also been largely unsuccessful.101
To transport its workers to the North Slope, HB & R has uniformly
purchased commercial airline tickets for its employees, which cost, on
average, between $1,000 and $1,200 per round-trip ticket from each
employee's home to the Dead Horse Airport.102 HB & R deducts the
94. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 6-7, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
95. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. Every employee has an alternate who works during the alternate
three-week period. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 5, Hb & R (No. 99-3206). During the three-week
"off' period, the workers can be called upon to perform services for HB & R in the lower forty-eight
states. Id. at 8.
96. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689; see also Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 5, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
The rooms are approximately eight feet by twelve feet in size and house bunk beds for the workers.
Id. There are typically two to four workers per room. Id. The oil companies own the barracks and
rent the space to HB & R for seventy-five dollars per day per worker. Id. Meals are served cafe-
teria-style twenty-four hours per day, and the workers are not permitted to have alcohol. Id. The
toilet and shower facilities are communal or military-style. Id. Firearms are prohibited, and the
workers cannot fish or hunt. Id. at 5-6. There is no entertainment, such as movies, gyms, restaurants,
swimming pools, or other recreation facilities provided for the workers. Id. at 5.
97. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 7, HB & R (No. 99-3206). Because of the weather and vary-
ing demands of the oil companies, the precise amount of work to be done at any time is nearly
impossible to predict. Id. During the past twenty years, the number of workers on the North Slope has
varied between nine and twenty. Id. No work is performed during "white-out" periods when the
visibility is low due to snowstorms or when the temperature outside is less than forty degrees below
zero Fahrenheit. Brief on Appeal for Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 5, HB & R, Inc. v. United
States, 229 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3206) [hereinafter "Appellee's Brief on Appeal"].
98. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. HB & R v. United States, No. Al-96-141, slip op. at 2 (D. N.D. Apr. 28, 1998). However,
HB & R never posted job listings anywhere in Alaska, choosing instead to advertise by "word of
mouth." Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 6, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
102. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. As a practical matter, most of HB & R's employees would be
unable to independently purchase these tickets because of the high cost and the frequency with which
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costs of the tickets as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
Internal Revenue Code § 162, but does not include the value of the
tickets in its employees' wages.103
For the tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993, the Service assessed tax
deficiencies on HB & R because the company did not withhold or pay
income tax or FICA taxes on the value of the employee airfare to the
North Slope. 104 After duly paying the assessed deficiencies and having
its administrative claim for refund denied by the Service, HB & R filed a
refund action in the United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota.105 On appeal from the district court's decision, the Eighth
Circuit held that the value of the airline tickets paid for by HB & R was
not wages subject to either income tax or FICA tax withholding .106
III. THE EXIGENCIES IN ACTION
The crux of HB & R was whether the value of employer-paid airfare
to the workplace constituted wages subject to income and FICA taxes. 107
The government argued that because the cost of commuting to one's
workplace is a non-deductible expense, HB & R's payment of the cost of
travel to the North Slope work-site constituted remuneration to its
employees and that this remuneration was wages subject to both FICA
and income taxes. 108 According to the government's theory, if HB &
the tickets must be purchased. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
103. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9, HB & R (No. 99-3206). The pay for a North Slope
employee is about $18 per hour, with the opportunity for significant overtime. Id. Including overtime
pay, the average North Slope worker earns $40,000 per year for twenty-six weeks of work. Id.
Including both benefits and salary, the average cost to HB & R for each employee is approximately
$120,000 per year. Id.
104. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. The Service assessed HB & R $183,129 in taxes, $97,617.31 in
interest, and a penalty of $53.91, for all four quarters of 1990 and 1991 and the first three quarters of
1992. Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 2, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
105. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 689. HB & R paid the Service $722.77 for the third quarter of 1992
and promptly filed its administrative refund claim. Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 1-2, HB & R (No.
99-3206).
106. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 692. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
came to a divergent result, from which both the Service and HB & R appealed. HB & R v. United
States, No. Al-96-141, slip op. at 5-6 (D. N.D. Apr. 29, 1998). Judge Patrick A. Conmy determined
that the airfare from the lower forty-eight to Anchorage constituted wages because Anchorage was
the closest location to which the employees could reasonably be expected to relocate. Id. The district
court explained, however, that
[t]he unique factual situation presented here when viewed in conjunction with the incredi-
ble prolixity and complexity of the tax code and the regulations promulgated in connec-
tion with that code operate, in the opinion of the court, to exonerate the employer from
liability for failure to withhold.
Id. at 5 (citing Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31-32 (1978)). Then, inexplica-
bly, the court granted the Service's motion for summary judgment on the issue of failure to withhold
FICA taxes and granted HB & R's motion for summary judgment on the issue of failure to withhold
income taxes. Id. at 5-6. As a result, HB & R was excused from withholding income taxes, but not
FICA taxes. Id.
107. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 690-91.
108. Id. at 690. Because Anchorage is the city nearest Dead Horse where HB & R's employees
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R's employees had paid for the airfare themselves, they could not have
deducted the airfare as a travel expense under § 162(a)(2) because,
under the vocational test, the North Slope was the employees' tax
home. 109 As such, the reimbursement or payment of any such expenses
could not be excluded from the wage base subject to withholding under
§§ 3121 or 3401.110
Conversely, HB & R argued that because the airfare costs were
incurred by HB & R as a result of the exigencies of its business, the costs
did not constitute commuting expenses."I' HB & R further asserted that
because the travel costs were not otherwise non-deductible commuting
expenses they were not remuneration or wages subject to income or
FICA withholding.11 2 Claiming that the ban on deducting "com-
muting" expenses applies only when the expenses are incurred on a
daily basis, HB & R also argued that because of the intermittent nature of
its employees' travel, the airfare did not constitute non-deductible
commuting expenses.113
A. THE COURT REJECTS THE GOVERNMENT'S SYLLOGISM
In formulating its holding, the Eighth Circuit first noted the general
rule that "an employee's expenses in commuting from home to work
are personal, not deductible business expenses."114 Discounting the Ser-
vice's "syllogism" that because commuting expenses are non-
deductible expenses for the employee, HB & R's payment of such
expenses constituted taxable wages subject to withholding, the court
articulated a narrow view of the employer's obligation to withhold.115
Quoting Central Illinois, the court noted that while reimbursement of
certain expenses may constitute taxable income to the employee, it does
not necessarily follow that the employer has a withholding obligation. 116
could reasonably be expected to reside, the Service did not assert that the costs of airfare from
Anchorage to Dead Horse should be considered wages. Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 12, 20, HB &
R (No. 99-3206). This is surprising in light of the Service's previous success in precluding the deduc-
tion of commuting expenses to work-sites where the employee was unable, for one reason or another,
to live in close proximity to the work-site. See supra notes 59-61, and accompanying text.
109. Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 21, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
110. Id. In its opinion, the district court noted that the Service's argument "is stated in a wonder-
fully pellucid manner in the filings, is logical, supported by numerous decisions and in the opinion of
the Court, wrong." HB & R v. United States, No. A1-96-141, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 28, 1998).
111. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 14, HB & R (No. 99-3206).
112. Id.
113. Id. 13-22.
114. HB & R v. United States, 229 F.3d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 2000).
115. Id. Rejecting the IRS's argument at the district court level, Judge Conmy aptly noted that
the IRS was wrong in attempting to impose liability on the total sum expended for airline
travel despite the ridiculous outcome which results from such a holding. Alice appears to
be alive and well not only in wonderland, but also in the attempt of the IRS to make
reality subordinate to its rules.
HB & R v. Commissioner, No. Al-96-141, slip op. at 5 (Apr. 28, 1998).
116. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 690.
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Indeed, "[r]equired withholding, therefore, is rightly much narrower
than subjectability to income taxation." 117
The court then considered the Treasury Regulations relevant to the
withholding statutes and specifically looked to Treasury Regulation
sections 31.3401(a)-l(b) and 31.3121(a)-l(h). 18 Those Regulations
provide:
Traveling and other expenses. Amounts paid specifically-
either as advances or reimbursements-for traveling or other
bona fide ordinary and necessary expenses incurred or
reasonably expected to be incurred in the business of the
employer are not wages and are not subject to withholding. 119
Relying on the unambiguous language of the Regulations, the court
determined that they "do not expressly distinguish between commuting
from home to work, and other employee traveling, so long as the ex-
pense is ordinary and necessary to the business of the employer."1 20
The court stated that when viewed from the perspective of the employer
HB & R, the costs associated with transporting workers to the North
Slope were incurred regularly and necessarily in the business of provid-
ing hot oil services to North Slope oil producers.121 Because the with-
holding regulations instruct the employer to exclude from withholding
those expenses incurred regularly and necessarily in the pursuit of its
business, as opposed to the employee's, the court concluded that HB &
R was justified in not withholding income and FICA taxes based on the
value of the airfare.122
B. THE COURT DOES NOT ENGAGE IN A TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
By relying on the Treasury Regulations applicable to withholding
of income and FICA taxes, the Eighth Circuit artfully avoided employ-
ing a traditional travel expense analysis.123 Pursuant to Flowers and its
progeny, the Eighth Circuit is bound to ensure that travel expenses are
deducted under § 162 only when they are reasonable and necessary,
117. Id. at 690-91 (quoting Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 29 (1978)).
118. Id. at 691.
119. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)-l(b) (2001) (excluding travel expenses from wages subject to
income tax withholding); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-l(h) (2001) (excluding travel expenses from wages
subject to FICA tax withholding).
120. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 691.
121. Id. The court went so far as to say that the regulations "instruct the employer to focus on
whether travel expenses are ordinary and necessary to its business." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (distinguishing Flowers because in that case the Court "view[ed] the expenses from the
income tax perspective of the employee, rather than the withholding tax perspective of the
employer").
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incurred while away from home, and incurred in the pursuit of
business. 124 Pursuant to Code §§ 3101(a) and 3401(a), the deductibility
of employee travel expenses under § 162 is linked to exclusion from
wages for withholding tax purposes because travel expenses which could
be deducted by the employee under § 162 are necessarily excluded
from the realm of wages subject to withholding.125
The court in HB & R, however, did not employ such an analysis. 126
Presumably, the court would have determined that the airfare to the
North Slope was reasonable and necessary (prong one) because flying
the workers to the North Slope was the only means of supplying HB & R
with a workforce at the site. Furthermore, the court expressly concluded
that the airfare was incurred regularly and necessarily in the pursuit of
HB & R's business (prong three). 127 Thus, as in many other cases,
deductibility of the airfare would have hinged on prong two of the
Flowers test; namely, whether HR & R's employees were away from
"home" when the expenses were incurred.128
Given the Eighth Circuit's prior adoption of the vocational test, the
HB & R employees would have presumably been expected to, at least,
reside in Anchorage, thus making Anchorage their "tax home." Conse-
quently, the airfare from the lower forty-eight states to Alaska would not
have been incurred while away from home. Instead, the airfare would
have constituted normal commuting expenses, the payment of which by
HB & R would have been the payment of wages subject to withholding.
Thus, had the court simply employed a traditional travel expense
analysis, it is likely that the airfare would have been considered a
non-deductible commuting expense and thus includible in wages subject
to withholding. HB & R's benefit from the court's alternative analysis
only underscores the necessity that the Supreme Court determine the
"tax home" issue once and for all.
C. THE COURT PASSES ON THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION IN GROSS INCOME
Although not directly addressing the issue, the court's decision did
not preclude assessment of deficiencies on the individual oil workers em-
ployed by HB & R. Indeed, the district court noted that if the Service
"has the desire to pursue the individual employees who are responsible
for the payment of taxes on under reported income due to the 'personal
124. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465,470 (1946).
125. HB & R, 229 F.3d at 690-91.
126. Id. at 691.
127. Id.
128. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 470.
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nature' of the air fares, then the court wishes them [the Service] well."129
So, while the court determined that the value of the airfare did not
constitute "wages" subject to withholding, it bypassed the issue of
whether the individual employees were required to include that value in
their income.1 30
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
While the facts of HB & R seem peculiar to exigencies of HB & R's
business, workers on the North Slope of Alaska are not the only employ-
ees who reside in one location and must travel to distant work locations
for some period of time. For example, most members of Congress main-
taining a residence in their home state are unable to simply drive from
that residence to Washington, D.C., each day of a legislative session. In
recognition of the special circumstances faced by Congressional mem-
bers, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 established a special travel expense
deduction rule for the members.131 The Act permits members of Con-
gress to elect to be "away from home" and "in pursuit of trade or
business" each legislative day as an exception to § 162.132 Similarly, a
special exception was carved out for federal employees participating in
federal criminal investigations. 133
Commercial fisherpersons who board their ships at a home port and
travel far out to sea to reach remote fishing grounds where they fish for
multiple weeks before returning to port with their catch are another
example.134 Under such circumstances, it is impossible for the fisher-
persons to relocate their residential home to the situs of their trade on the
ship at sea. 135  In such instances, the fisherpersons "tax home" is
considered their homeport where they ordinarily begin and end their
trips.136 The fisherpersons may deduct travel and living costs only when
away for a period longer than an ordinary workday and overnight.137
129. HB & R v. United States, No. A1-96-141, slip op. at 5 (D. N.D. Apr. 28, 1998).
130. Id. at 5-6. Presumably, however, the deficiency assessment period for most of the individu-
al taxpayer employees had already expired by the time the Eighth Circuit's decision was issued. HB &
R, 229 F.3d at 692.
131. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(h)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 162(h). Prior to Congress' codification for its members' travel expenses, mem-
bers of Congress were not permitted to deduct expenses incurred in Washington, D.C. Lindsay v.
Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
133. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 818, (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 162(h)(4)).
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As these examples illustrate, the exigencies of HB & R's business
are not, in fact, entirely unique and need to be treated in a rational
fashion although the circumstances may seem outside the norm. Indeed,
taken to its extreme, the Service's position could require future workers
on space stations to pay FICA and income taxes based on the value of
transporting the workers, via rocket, to their space stations.
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit made the correct decision. Pursuant
to Treasury Regulation sections 31.3401(a)-l(b) and 31.3121(a)-l(h),
the court properly shifted the focus from the employee to the exigencies
of the employer's business. 138 Where the nature of the employer's
business is such that it necessarily must pay travel expenses on behalf of
its employees, those expenses are not and should not be considered
wages subject to withholding.139
138. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)-l(b) (2001); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-l(h) (2001).
139. HB & R v. United States, 229 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2000).

